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TWO BASIC OPTIONS STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCERS: 
BUYING PUTS AND SHORTING CALLS 
Brian H. Schmiesing 
Beginning in the Fall of 1984, agricultural producers and agri-
businesses will be confronted with another dimension of the deregulation 
trend in American Industry. Options on domestically produced agri-
cultural commodities once again can be traded. As the country debates 
the 1985 Farm Bill, producers and agribusinesses must be making every 
effort to be prepared for the possibility of greater dependence on the 
market oriented policies in agriculture. In a free market environment, 
options, and their associated strategies must be considered as part of 
producer and agribusiness market strategies. This paper describes the 
basic terms and types of options, examines two option trading strategies 
and discusses where commodity options fit in the alternative marketing 
strategies available to producers. 
Background on Which Commodity Options Might be Traded 
The options on domestically produced agricultural commodities will 
probably be traded in the fall of 1984. Expectations are for the following 
options to be traded: live cattle and live hogs on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, corn and soybeans on the Chicago Board of Trade, spring wheat 
at the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, hard red winter wheat options at 
Kansas City Board of Trade, and soybeans on the Mid-American Commodity 
Exchange. The CFTC pilot program specifies that the option must be 
traded on the same exchange as the underlying commodity futures contract. 
Each exchange will be limited to two agricultural options and the options 
will be only on the futures contracts not the physicals (9, p. 1). 
The current rule of only two options per exchange has a distinct 
disadvantage for producers. The Mid-American Connnodity Exchange contract 
sizes are more consistent with the needs of agricultural producers. The 
smaller size of these options would enable producers to have more flexibility 
in the formation of their option trading strategies. The Chicago Board 
of Trade also has a broader range of grain commodity futures contract 
than the other exchanges. The desire for equality of treatment of the 
exchanges may deny a number of producers the use of very important risk 
transfer mechanism for their crop. 
How Are Options Different from Futures Contracts 
An option conveys the right but not the obligation to buy or sell a 
given amount of a connnodity at a pre-determined price on or before a 
specific date. Three basic differences exist between futures contracts 
and cormnodity options. 
First the buyer of the option has the option to exercise his right 
not the obligation. If the exercising of the right is unprofitable, the 
buyer can make the decision not to exercise. Futures contracts create a 
promise of future delivery or acceptance of delivery. The buyer of a 
futures contract must accept delivery if he does not offset his position 
in the futures market. Second, the option will involve a specific 
predetermined price or strike price. This strike price is stated explicitly 
on the option and is essential to determination of the value of the 
option. Futures contracts do not have an explicitly stated price, but 
rather the price of commodity is determined in trading pit by open 
outcry (1). 
Finally, the options involve the delivery of a futures contract not 
the physical commodity. Futures contracts specify the delivery of a 
physical commodity at a set of specified delivery points (1, pp. 57). 
Two Types of Options 
Two types of commodity options will exist. A "call" option refers 
to the right to buy at a pre-determined price, while a "put" option 
refers to the right to sell at a pre-determined price. In many ways 
these two types of options are the exact opposites. Because of their 
differences, they provide producers the ability to develop strategies 
for a broad range of market conditions. 
If the producer purchases an $8.50 soybean call option, s/he has 
purchased the right to buy the soybean futures contract at $8.50 until 
the option expires. The $8.50 price is the pre-determined price or the 
"strike price". This is the price at which the call option buyer can 
buy the futures contract if s/he elects to exercise the right contained 
in the option. In contrast an $8.50 soybean put option enables the 
producer to purchase the right to sell the soybean futures contract at 
$8.50 until the option expires. 
To purchase an option, the buyer of the option must pay an option 
premium to the seller of the option. The seller of the option can also 
be referred to as the writer of the option. For example, if a buyer of 
a put option is willing to pay 50 cents per bushel to sell the soybean 
futures contract at $8.50, s/he would buy a put option for 50 cents per 
bushel. 
The size of the option premium is determined by the relationship 
between the strike price and futures market price, the number of days 
before the expiration of the option, price volatility of the futures 
contract and interest rates. The size of the option premium coupled 
with the producer's expectations for future price changes are the essential 
determinants of whether the producer should buy a put option or sell a 
call option. In the remaining part of the paper, the selling or writing 
of a put option will be referred to as "shorting the call". 
The Relationship Between the Strike Price 
and the Futures Contract Price 
Presented on Table 1 is a sample of premium quotations for a "class" 
of calls and puts. A "class" of option refers to all the puts or calls 
for a specific commodity i.e. all soybean futures contracts. A "series" 
of options refers to those options in the "class" that have the same 
expiration date and strike price. The put and call options having a 
strike price of $8.00 expiring in February is an example of a series. 
The "March 1985" is in reference to the Chicago Board of Trade March 
1985 soybean futures contract. The option rights refer to the buying 
and selling of this specific contract. Important: this date does not 
refer to when this option will expire as is the case with stock options. 
The options traded on the "March 1985" futures contract will be expiring 
in February 1985 i.e. the month prior to the delivery month. 
Below "March 1985" is a price quote of "$8.00". The quote will 
refer to the close or settle for the futures contract. Remember this is 
the price established for the futures contract during the close of the 
trading day. This settle price is used in the calculation of gains and 
losses in the futures market. However, its importance in options trading 
is its use as a reference point for the examination of the option premiums-
The strike price is the pre-determined price specified on the 
option contract for a specified right. An $8.00 strike price for a call 
refers to the right to buy at the March 1985 soybean futures contract at 
$8.00. The $8.00 strike price for put refers to the right to sell at 
that strike price. At any specified time a number of options may exist 
for a specified commodity futures. For the example, the number of 
strike prices was assumed to be five, this implies five call options and 
five put options. An essential dimension of option strategies is the 
selection of the "correct" option for a specific strategy. 
The premiums for the calls and puts are quoted underneath their 
respective headings. Each .01 can be perceived as being representative 
of 1 cent per bushel. However, each .01 has a value equal to .01 times 
5,000 bushel or $50.00. Remember that the Chicago Board of Trade soybean 
futures contract has a size of 5,000 bushel. For example, an $8.00 put 
will cost the buyer 21 cents per bushel or $1050 to purchase the right 
to sell the March 1985 futures contract at $8.00. 
Intrinsic Value of Option Premiums 
Any option premium has two components i.e. intrinsic value and time 
value. Intrinsic value of the option is the dollar value of the option 
if the option was exercised immediately with the specified futures 
contract price and option premium. 
Intrinsic value of a call option is calculated as follows: 
(1) Call Intrinsic Value Current Futures 
Contract Price 
Option Strike 
Price 
If and only if the "Current Futures Contract Price" is greater than 
the "Option Strike Price", otherwise the call's intrinsic value 
equals zero. 
The meaning of the above becomes more clear if we look at two examples. 
The first example is where a call has positive intrinsic value and the 
second example is a call where the intrinsic value is zero. 
The $7.75 call option has a option strike price less than the 
current futures contract price of $8.00. If the buyer of the call 
option exercised his right to buy the futures contract at $7.75, s/he 
takes the futures contract and sells at the current price of $8.00. If 
we do the required calculation we see that the intrinsic option value is 
25 cents. 
(2) Call Intrinsic Value = $8.00 - $7. 75 = $ . 25 
Thus, the call option has value if exercised. 
In contrast the $9. 00 call option has a option strike price less 
than the current futures contract price of $8. 00. If the buyer would 
exercise his option he would have to pay $9. 00 to buy the futures contract. 
But what is the market value of the futures contract? The current 
futures exchange price is only $8.00 and if he sold the contract at this 
price he would experience a loss of $1. 00 per bushel. So rather than 
enter into this unprofitable transaction, the option buyer would not 
exercise the option. If the option is not exercised, its value is zero. 
Therefore, the intrinsic value of the $9. 00 call is zero. 
The intrinsic value of put option is computed in the following 
manner: 
(3) Put Intrinsic Value Option Strike 
Price 
Current Futures 
Contract Price 
If and only if the "Current Futures Contract Price" is less than 
the "Option Strike Price", otherwise the put's intrinsic value 
equals zero. 
Because a put involves the right to sell the conditions required for the 
put to have intrinsic value are the opposite of the call. Let us consider 
the case of the $9. 00 put. The put buyer could purchase the March 1985 
futures contract for $8. 00 and then exercise his right to sell the 
futures contract at $9. 00. This transaction would result in a profit of 
$1. 00 before commissions. 
(4) Put Intrinsic Value = $9. 00 - $8. 00 = $1. 00 
If we exercise the $7. 75 put, we would receive $7. 75 in our sales 
of the futures contracts to the put option seller. This transaction 
would result in a $. 25 loss and the best decision is not to exercise the 
put. Again, if we do not exercise the right contained in the option its 
value is zero. 
Time Value in Option Premiums 
Time value of an option is the dollar value of the expectations of 
future price movements. The most important word in the definition is 
"expectations. " Only if the futures contract price moves in the appropriate 
direction will this time value become intrinsic value for the option. 
Time value is representative of speculation on future price movements 
and the payment to the seller for accepting the price risk contained in 
the option. 
The time value of an option is defined as 
(5) Time Value of 
the Option 
= Option Premium Intrinsic Value 
In our example, the $7. 75 call has 10 cents in time value or 35 cents 
minus 25 cents, while the $9.00 call has 2 cents of time value or 2 
cents minus zero. Table 2 presents the intrinsic values and time values 
of the options given on Table 1. Again the reader can see how the puts 
and calls are the opposites of each other. When call options have 
intrinsic value, the put options will not have intrinsic value and visa 
versa. 
Additional Terms Based on Intrinsic Value and Time Value 
An additional classification scheme of options is based upon the 
relationship between the strike price and the futures contract price. 
If an option has intrinsic value, the option is said to be "in-the-
money". For a put to be "in-the-money" the current futures price must 
be less than the strike price of the put, while a call is the exact 
opposite. 
If the futures contract price equals the strike price, the option 
is said to be "at-the-money". In this case the required relationship is 
Table 1: Sample of Put and Call Option Premiums for the Chicago 
Each 
Board of Trade March 1985 futures Contract on February 1, 1985. 
Strike 
Price 
$9. 00 
$8. 50 
$8. 00 
$7. 75 
$7. 50 
. 01 premium = $50. 00 
Premium 
. 02 
.OS 
. 21 
. 35 
. 54 
March 1985 
$8. 00 
Put 
Premium 
1. 01 
.SS 
. 21 
. 10 
.OS 
Table 2: Sample of Put and Call Option Premiums for the Chicago Board 
of Trade March 1985 futures Contract on February 1, 1985. 
March 1985 
$8. 00 
Call Option Put Option 
Strike Option Intrinsic Time Option Intrinsic Time 
Price Premium Value Value Premium Value Value 
$9. 00 . 02 0 . 02 1. 02 1. 00 . 02 
$8. 50 . 05 0 . 05 . 55 . 50 . 05 
$8. 00 . 21 0 . 21 . 21 0 . 21 
$7. 75 . 35 . 25 . 10 . 10 0 . 10 
$7. 5 0  .54 .so .05 . 05 0 . 05 
Each . 01 premium = $50.00 on a 5, 000 bushel contract. 
identical for puts and calls. An important characteristic of "at-the­
money" options is that this is when the time premium is the maximum for 
an option "class." Remember time premiums represent the expectations 
for a favorable price change. "At-the-money" options have the greatest 
probability of a favorable change in the futures price, that will convert 
the time value into intrinsic value. 
Like the "at-the-money" options the "out-of-the-money" options have 
no intrinsic value. If they were exercised immediately they would have 
zero value. Their value is entirely based on the expectations for a 
favorable price movement. 
What Determines Time Value? 
The size of the time premium is a function of the number of days 
before the expiration of the option, the price volatility of the futures 
contract, interest rates and the relationship between the futures price 
and the strike price. Time value decreases as the option approaches 
expiration. The farther the option is from expiration the larger the 
time premium. The time premium does not decline in a straight line 
fashion, rather the closer the option is to expiration the larger the 
rate of decline in the option's time value (see Figure 1). The reason 
for this is the probability of a large favorable price movement declines. 
If we are nine months from the expiration of a soybean option, the 
possibility of a one dollar increase or decline in the soybean futures 
contract is larger than the possibility of a one dollar increase when 
there is only 10 days until the option's expiration. 
One of the most important factors in determining option time value 
is the price volatility of the futures contract. As the price volatility 
increases the greater the potential for a large favorable price movement 
for any of the options. Price volatility can be measured by a number of 
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statistical measurement techniques (12). For the present discussion we 
will use the annual percentage change we can expect about the futures 
contract price. The subraction and addition of this annual percentage 
change from the current futures prices gives a range of prices. This 
range of prices represents our expectation for price changes in the 
futures contract on an annual basis. Our expectation is that 68 percent 
of the futures contract prices will be contained in this range. If the 
futures price is $8.00 and we indicate the price volatility is 10 percent, 
the implication is that we are 68 percent confident that the soybean 
futures contract price will be in a range of $7.20 to $8.80 during a 
year period. 
There is a direct relationship between the level of price volatility 
and the size of the time premium for a specific options contract. The 
greater the price volatility, the greater the time premium contained in 
an option (see Table 3). For an at-the-money options we see an almost 
quadrupling of the time value in the put from 16 cents to 80 cents per 
bushel. It has been argued that put options represent a form of price 
insurance. But as is readily evident the cost of the price insurance 
becomes more expensive when prices become more volatile. The very time 
a producer would want to buy price insurance. But remember that if time 
premiums are increasing on puts, the time premiums are also increasing 
on calls. During a volatile price period, a producer can receive large 
time premium payments if he sells a call. 
Recognition must be given to the fact that price volatility on 
futures contracts changes during the marketing year. For example, the 
November 1983 soybean futures contract price ranged between 23 percent 
to 51 percent during the period of June 1 to September 1 (see Table 4). 
This variation in price volatility implies there will be opportunities 
Table 3: Hypothetical Put Option Values for a Soybean Futures Contract 
Trading at $8. 00 Per Bushel When Price Volatility of the 
Futures Contract is Varied to Specified Levels. a/ 
Strike Price of 
The O tion 
$9. 00 
$8.50 
$8. 00 
$7. 75 
$7.50 
Price Volatility Levels Expressed as a Percentage 
of the Futures Contract Price of $8.00 
50% 25% 10% 
1.42 
1.09 
. 80 
.67 
.55 
1.07 
• 70 
.40 
. 28 
.19 
1. 00 
.51 
.16 
.06 
.02 
a/ This table is based on the Black options pricing model for conunodity 
futures options. The additional assumptions of the table are that 
the interest rate is 14 percent and 100 days exist before the put 
options expire. 
Table 4: Price Volatility for the November 1983 Soybean Futures 
Contract Based on Closing Prices During the Specified 
Month. a/ 
Date 
Description of 
Terms 
June July August September 
a. Price Volatility 
of Month 
b. Closing Soybean price 
on the first of 
Following Month 
23% 
$6. 37 
31% 
$7. 55 
51% 42% 
$8. 81 $8. 29 
a/ Price volatility of the month was based on the closing prices of 
November 1983 soybean futures contract during the month. Plus or 
minus this percentage of price volatility from the current closing 
price would approximate that we would expect 68 percent of the 
observed prices would be contained in this range during the year. 
for producers to generate additional revenues through selling calls. 
Interest rates increase the carrying costs of owning an option. If 
interest rates increase the expectation is for the time premium on the 
option to decline. Among the four factors being discussed as determining 
the size of the time premium, this factor has the weakest impact. 
The final factor is the relationship between the strike price and 
futures contract price. The maximum time premium occurs when an option 
is at-the-money. As we move to any other strike prices the time premium 
declines. This condition holds for both calls and puts. With this 
basic understanding of the pricing of options let us examine put options 
as a marketing strategy relative to forward contracting and cash marketing. 
Comparison of Alternative Marketing Strategies: 
Put options represent an alternative method of establishing a 
forward price for a producer's soybeans. Producers can establish a 
forward price for soybeans by either signing a forward pricing contract 
with a local elevator or hedging the commodity on the futures market. 
The current discussion will concentrate upon how put options compare to 
cash marketing and forward pricing of grain at the local elevator. 
Assume that on June 1 a producer is considering the possibility of 
pricing 5, 000 bushels of soybeans that he plans to harvest in the fall. 
If the producer decides to wait until November 1 to price the soybeans, 
he has selected a cash marketing strategy. Reasons for selecting this 
strategy are the expectations of higher prices for soybeans in the fall 
and a producer not knowing for sure on June 1 his fall production level. 
Forward pricing at a local elevator locks the producer in at a 
specific price. If prices go down and the producer has forward contracted 
at a higher price, the forward pricing decision would have been profitable. 
However, if cash prices increase significantly, the producer would be 
unable to benefit from the price increases. 
Further, if a producer has a short crop that has been contracted at 
the lower price, he might have to buy soybeans to meet the delivery 
requirements of the contract. This potential loss is extremely unattractive 
from a risk management perspective, because when the producer has a 
short crop his net profit is likely to be either very very small or 
negative. To pay an elevator for every contracted bushel not produced 
could mean serious financial problems. To control this type of financial 
risk, producers often limit the percentage of future production that 
they forward contract. 
Put options are an attractive marketing alternative because they 
have the ability to partially overcome both of these limitations to 
forward contracting. First, a put option establishes a basement price, 
but leaves open the possibility for a producer to benefit from upward 
price movements. Also, if the producer has a crop shortfall, he can 
sell his put option. His maximum loss would be the put option premium-­
not the price for an entire bushel of grain. 
Let us examine how a decrease or an increase in soybean prices 
would affect the consequences of each of the folfowing marketing alternatives. 
Case 1: Soybeans Decrease in Price 
On June 1, the producer is confronted with three marketing strategies: 
cash marketing in the fall, forward contracting at the local elevator 
and purchasing a put option. Table 5 summarizes the prices and revenues 
of the producer under each alternative. With the cash marketing alternative, 
the producer does nothing to establish a price. While in forward contracting 
he signs a contract with a local elevator for $7.50 for delivery on 
November 1, If the producer selects the put option alternative, he 
could buy a put option on the January futures contract that is traded on 
Table 5 :  Comparison of Cash Marketing, Forward Contracting and Put 
Option Marketing Strategies When Soybean Prices Increase 
or Decline 
THE SOYBEAN PRICE DECREASES 
1. Cash Price received 
on November 1 
2. Plus Premium for 
Put Option Sold 
on November 1 
3, Minus Premium for 
Put Option Bought 
on June 1 
4. Total Revenue 
Per Bushel 
Cash 
Marketing 
Marketing Strategy 
Forward 
Contracting 
Put 
Options 
FROM $7. 50 ON JUNE 1 TO $6. 00 ON NOVEMBER 1: 
$6. 00 $7. 50 A/ $6. 00 
n/a n/a + $1. 60 
n/a n/a - $ .70 
$6. 00 $7. 50 $6. 90 
THE SOYBEAN PRICE INCREASES FROM $7. 50 ON JUNE 1 TO $9.00 ON NOVEMBER 1: 
1. Cash Price received 
on November 1 $9. 00 $7.50 $9. 00 
2. Plus Premium for 
Put Option Sold 
on November 1 n/a n/a + .10 
3. Minus Premium for 
Put Option Bought 
on June 1 n/a n/a - $ .70 
4. Total Revenue 
Per Bushel $9. 00 $7. 50 $8. 40 
A/ Producer forward contracted with elevator for November 1 delivery 
for a price of $7. 50 per bushel. 
the Chicago Board of Trade. The January futures contract on June 1 is 
trading for $8.00 per bushel. This is the price the futures contract 
buyer must pay for a contract specifying the delivery of 5, 000 bushel of 
soybeans during the delivery month of January. 
Assume the producer must pay 70 cents for a $8.00 January put 
option. This means the producer has paid 70 cents to have the right to 
sell the January soybean futures contract at $8.00. In buying the put 
option it is important to realize the producer is not buying price 
protection on the physical commodity. Rather the price protection is 
indirect through the futures market. This relationship between the 
futures market and local cash market must be understood if options are 
going to be used effectively. 
Now let us assume it is November 1. The producer had a good crop 
and has the soybeans to sell or deliver. Cash soybean prices dropped to 
$6.00 a bushel and the January futures contract now is only selling for 
$6. 50. There has been a drop of $1.50 in both the cash and futures 
market. The success of the alternative strategies can now be evaluated. 
The worst strategy would be cash marketing. The producer would 
only receive $6.00 per bushel. The best strategy would be forward 
contracting at the local elevator with a received price of $7.50. 
The put option strategy would require the producer to sell his 
soybeans for $6.00 at the local elevator. Offsetting the drop in the 
cash market, however, in the profit from his put purchase. Assume the 
producer was able to obtain a $1.60 for his $8.00 January put option. 
Why the price increase in the put option? Remember the put option 
represents the right to sell the January futures contract for $8.00. If 
the January soybean futures contract is selling for $6.50 on November 1, 
the right to sell the contract at $8.00 definitely has increased in 
value. The profit from the put option transaction would equal the $1.60 
put option premium minus the 70 cents that the producer paid for the put 
option. The net price received by the producer with a put option, 
therefore would be $6.90. This is an intermediate price and is between 
the prices received from cash marketing and forward contracting. 
Case 2: Soybeans Increase in Price 
Assume the producer's marketing activities and the prices in the 
various markets are the same on June 1 as in Case 1. But instead of 
declining, cash soybean prices increase in the local cash market to 
$9.00 per bushel and the January futures contract price increases to 
$9.50 on November 1. The best strategy in this case was cash marketing-­
with the producer selling his beans at $9.00 at the local elevator. 
The former preferred strategy, forward contracting, would involve a 
price of only $7.50. This is the worst strategy in case II. 
Our option trading producer would deliver his soybeans to the local 
elevator for $9.00. But offsetting this price is a loss in the put 
option transaction. With the January futures contract trading for 
$9.50, the right to sell the January futures contract at $8.00 would not 
be attractive. If you would sell a January futures contract for $9.50, 
why would you pay for the right to sell the contract at $8.00? You 
would if you felt that the January futures contract might drop below the 
$8.00 strike price before the expiration of the put option. 
Assume that a put options buyer would be willing to buy the producer's 
put option for 10 cents. The net price received by the producer would 
equal $8. 40. The loss in the options market was 60 cents (the 70 cents 
paid for the option minus the 10 cent selling price). Unlike the forward 
contracting, the put option would let the producer benefit from the 
price rise. However, again the option strategy was second best. 
Can a put option strategy ever be the worst marketing alternative? 
Yes, this would happen if soybean prices do not change or the price 
change is small. An illustration would be soybean prices staying at 
$7. 50 in the cash market and being $8.00 for the January soybean futures 
contract. Both the cash marketing and forward contracting strategies 
would have resulted in prices of $7.50. The option strategy would have 
resulted in the producer receiving $7. 50 a bushel in the cash market, 
but the put option would have probably been sold for less than what was 
originally paid. This loss would have decreased the price received by 
the producer to a level below $7. 50 or below the two other marketing 
alternatives. In the final analysis, however, all of the other factors 
can impact on puts rank as a strategy. 
Additional Factors Affecting the Ranking of Puts 
as a Marketing Strategy 
In the above cases we have only varied the absolute level of prices 
in the futures and cash markets. Among the other factors to consider 
are the basis, transaction costs and "insurance" premiums. The basis is 
the difference between the local cash market and a specified futures 
contract i.e. the cash price minus the futures contract price. In the 
analysis the basis was assumed to be constant at -50 cents or "50 cents 
under" the futures contract. For example, during the initial decision 
period of June 1 the cash market price was $7. 50 and the futures market 
price was $8. 00. The basis equaled $7. 50 minus $8. 00 or - 50 cents. 
In order to use commodity options effectively, the producer must 
understand the commodity futures basis for his marketing locations. If 
a basis "widens", the local cash market has become weaker relative to a 
specific futures contract. For example, the basis widens if the local 
cash prices falls and the futures price remains constant. A narrowing 
basis implies that the local cash price has become stronger relative to 
the futures contract. For example, a narrowing basis occurs if cash 
market price increases and the futures contract price does not change. 
Since cash marketing and put options do not establish a cash price 
for a future delivery date, these marketing strategies suffer a decline 
in revenues when the basis widens but gain revenues when the basis 
narrows. A forward pricing contract does establish a future cash price 
so the producer's cash price is not impacted by a change in the local 
basis. But with forward contracting a producer does not benefit from 
the "narrowing" of the local cash basis. 
The transaction costs associated with the three marketing strategies 
varies. To use the put option strategy the user must pay commissions to 
a broker to trade the put options. In a forward pricing contract, the 
elevator will have commission costs if the elevator uses the futures 
market to hedge the forward contract. These commission costs will be 
reflected in the bid price offered by the elevator. Because price 
protection transactions are not taken either by the producer or elevator 
in cash marketing, the transaction costs of cash marketing are zero. 
In cash marketing, the producer bears all the price risk and 
therefore does not have to compensate anyone for carrying the price 
risk. But in cash marketing, the producer carries all the risk of an 
adverse downward price movement. 
In forward contracting and put options, the downward price risk has 
been transferred away from the producer to another party. The grain 
producer transfers the price risk to the elevator with forward contracting, 
If the grain elevator hedges the grain contracted, the elevator is 
confronted with the risk of margin calls on their futures market position 
as well as adverse changes in the basis. A producer buying a put option 
transfers the downward price risk to the seller of the put option. The 
put seller has accepted the risk that the futures market price could 
decline. 
Producers must realize that the elevator and the put seller must be 
compensated for accepting this price risk. Elevators will lower their 
forward contract prices if they perceive their local basis risk to be 
too high and put sellers will require higher time premiums in the option 
premiums if prices become more uncertain. 
In review, the producer must know his local basis to determine 
which strategy has the potential to be the most effective. In knowing 
the expected basis for the delivery date of the forward pricing contract, 
he can calculate how much the elevator is charging to carry the price 
risk. If this risk premium is too large the producer may want to hedge 
on the futures market or buy a put option. But the producer may also 
find put options to have "too" high of risk premium reflected in the 
time premium. If this is the situation, the producer may want to examine 
the potential of selling or "shorting" a call option. 
Selling or "Shorting" a Call Option 
In selling the call option, the producer has sold the right to buy 
the futures contract at a specific price. The producer would receive 
the option premium rather than paying a premium. However, "shorting" a 
call is more risky than buying a put. With this strategy, the producer 
limits his upside potential and leaves himself exposed to downward price 
movements. But this strategy is appropriate when the expectations are 
for prices to be relatively stable or increasing. 
The reader should realize that this section will address in greater 
detail how one selects among different options when using option strategies. 
Although the material may appear to be complex on the surface, the 
underlying logic is based on the basic concepts in the previous sections. 
In selling calls, several basic points must be remembered. Because 
of the risk of this type of transaction, the producer will be required 
to have a margin account and be subject to margin calls. The original 
margin equals the option premium plus the margin required on the futures 
contract. If the option premium increases, the producer will be required 
to put forth additional margin money. This aspect is not attractive 
because of the requirement for additional capital beyond the capital 
already invested in the crop. Hopefully, an institutional innovation 
will be forth coming that will make call writing more attractive to 
producers (10, p. 1718). 
As was mentioned, this strategy has unlimited risk because there is 
no protection against a large downward price movement. Do not view this 
strategy as a "hedge". The futures contract price changes will not be 
fully reflected in the option premiums. For example, live cattle prices 
may drop $1. 00 on the June 1985 futures contract, but the call option 
premium may decline only 60 cents. But selling calls can be profitable 
under the correct conditions and with proper planning. Let us examine 
how this strategy might work for a cattle rancher. 
Selling Calls for a Cattle Rancher 
Assume we have a cattle rancher, who has a lot of fed cattle he 
feels will be ready to deliver in May. He is considering using an 
option strategy. In this example, we will assmne the basis for his 
local market is $1. 00 under the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's June 
futures contract. He is confronted with the option prices specified on 
Table 6. He notes that the time values of the puts are as follows: 
$1. 80 for the $64. 00 put, $2. 60 for the $66. 00 put and $2. 20 for the 
$68. 00 put. Since he is planning for delivery of the cattle at the end 
of May, he expects to suffer the loss of the majority of the time premium. 
Table 6: Sample of Put and Call Option Premiums for the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange of Trade June 1985 futures Contract on 
March 1, 1985. 
Strike 
Price Call 
$64. 00 4. 20 
$66. 00 3. 15 
$68. 00 2.25 
June 1985 
$66.50 
Put 
1. 80 
2.60 
3. 70 
Each . 01 premium = $40. 00 on 40,000 pound Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange futures contract for live cattle. 
Remember, time premiums disappear rapidly once the option approaches 
expiration. He feels this price insurance is too expensive because the 
loss of the time premium is an expense to the put owner. 
Instead he makes the decision that he will short or sell a call. 
In selling the call, he will receive the premium and will be required to 
place the premium in the margin account, plus margin money in the account 
for the underlying futures contract. If the option increases in value, 
he will have to place additional money in his margin account. However, 
if the option premium declines, he will be able to withdraw funds from 
his margin account. When he wants to liquidate his option position, he 
will have to buy the call option back. If the option is going to expire, 
worthless, the best strategy is to let the option expire rather than 
buying the call option back. 
The rancher must now make a decision on which call option to sell. 
To assist in his decision on which call to short, he completed a set of 
calculations given in Table 7. He has estimated that the futures contract 
could trade in a range of $58.00 to $73.50. After subtracting out the 
expected basis of $1.00 under the June futures contract, he established 
the cash price for his cattle for five price levels. The cash prices 
were projected to range from $57.00 to $72.50. 
The next step was to establish the profits and losses for each of 
the call options at the different futures contract prices. The revenues 
will equal what he will be able to sell the call for to a call option 
buyer. The cost of a call option in each transaction equals the option 
premium he must pay to buy back the option. His gross profit or loss on 
the call option transaction equals the revenue from selling the option 
minus the cost of buying the option back. 
If the option strike price is greater than the market price, the 
call option will expire worthless. No one will exercise an option that 
Table 7: Calculation of Total Revenue Received When Shorting Different 
Calls When Futures Prices Change between the Selling of 
Calls and Their Repurchase. 
Futures Market Price When Call 0Etion is ReEurchased 
DescriEtion $58.00 $63.00 $66.50 $70.00 $73.50 
A. Futures Price 
at Repurchase $58.00 $63.00 $66.50 $70.00 $73.50 
B. Adjust for the 
Basis $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 1.00 $ 1.00 
c. Local Cash Price $57.00 $62.00 $65.50 $69.00 $72 .50 
ANALYSIS OF SELLING $68.00 CALL 
D. Revenue from 
Selling Call $ 2.25 $ 2.25 $ 2.25 $ 2.25 $ 2.25 
E. Cost of Buying 
Call Back .oo .oo .oo $ 2.10 $ 5.55 
F. Total Revenue 
From Strategy $59.25 $62.25 $67.75 $69.15 $69.20 
ANALYSIS OF SELLING $66.00 CALL 
G. Revenue from 
Selling Call $ 3.15 $ 3.15 $ 3.15 $ 3.15 $ 3.15 
H. Cost of Buying 
Call Back .00 .00 $ .65 $ 4.05 $7.53 
I. Total Revenue 
From Strategy $60.15 $65.15 $68.00 $68.10 $68.12 
ANALYSIS OF SELLING $64.00 CALL 
J. Revenue from 
Selling Call $ 4.20 $ 4.20 $ 4.20 $ 4.20 $ 4.20 
K. Cost of Buying 
Call Back .00 .00 $ 2.60 $ 6.05 $ 9.53 
L. Total Revenue 
From Strategy $61. 20 $66.20 $67.10 $67.15 $67
°
.18 
requires the buyer to pay a higher price than the futures contract price 
at the futures exchange. For example, if the futures contract price is 
$60.00, the $66.00 call option will expire worthless. It will expire 
worthless because it would be cheaper to buy the futures contract on the 
exchange than to exercise the call option at the specified strike price. 
On Table 6 he entered in a zero for the situations where the option 
would expire worthless. 
On the remaining options he calculated the intrinsic value of the 
call option at a specific futures contract price and added in some 
expected time value. Even though he is planning to buy the call option 
back on the day prior to expiration, he expects the options to have some 
time value when he buys these in-the-money call options back. If the 
futures contract price is $70.00 and we are looking at the $66.00 call, 
this call will have $4.00 of intrinsic value or $70. 00 minus $66.00. 
The rancher assumed there would be $.05 of time value when he bought the 
$66.00 call option back. The option premium would equal $4.05. Remember 
that the option premium equals the time value plus the intrinsic value. 
His total revenue from the strategy would equal the projected cash 
price for the cattle sold, plus the gross profit or loss in the call 
option transactions. This figure represents the total revenues he would 
have available to offset transaction costs, margin account expenses and 
the cost of production. To simplify the example, the transaction costs, 
margin expenses and production expenses were not included in the example. 
The Best Option to Use Depends on the Change 
in the Futures Contract Price 
In examining Table 6, he notices that no single call option is the 
best strategy in all the price senarios. The $68.00 call would be the 
best option when futures prices run up to $73. 50, since his total revenue 
is $69.20. But this total revenue is less than the projected cash price 
of $72. 50. If the future contract price would drop to $58.00, his best 
strategy would be the $64.00 call with a total revenue of $61. 20, which 
is greater than an estimated cash price of $57. 00. Why do these specific 
rankings happen? 
In the upward price movement, the $68.00 call allowed the rancher 
to benefit from the fact that the strike price was higher than the 
futures contract price when he sold the call. This difference of $1. 50 
was not offset by an increase in the intrinsic value of the call option. 
In addition, the producer was able to benefit from the $2. 25 of time 
value contained in the $68. 00 call option whe he sold the call. This 
time value became intrinsic value as the futures price went above the 
strike price. Only after the intrinsic value of the option became 
greater than the time value of the option did the rancher have to pay 
more for the option in May than what he sold the option for in March. 
In the unfavorable price movement, the $64. 00 call allowed the 
rancher to benefit from the fact that the strike price was lower than 
the futures contract when he sold the call. The option had $2. 50 of 
intrinsic value and $1.70 of time value. As the futures price dropped, 
the level of intrinsic value also decreased. In this case, only after 
decline in the futures price totally offset the total premium received 
by the rancher did his total revenue begin to fall below the $65. 50. 
The selection of the correct call option to sell is based on what 
is expected to happen to the futures contract prices. Producers must 
establish a marketing plan based on a specific price expectation and 
have plans for situations when prices move gainst their position. As 
was evident in this discussion, the size of the time premium is an 
important factor in determining strategies. Large time premiums make 
the selling of calls attractive, while small time premiums increase the 
attractiveness of puts. There is a systematic scheme to the ranking of 
these basic marketing alternatives confronting producers. 
The Ranking of Alternatives 
A producer soon will have to select among the eight strategies 
discussed in this paper. The two current marketing alternatives are 
cash marketing and forward contracting. With calls and puts, the producer 
must select between using in-the-money, at-the-money, and out-of-the­
money options. Each of these options represents a distinct strategy 
based on a specific price expectation. Presented on Table 8 are the 
rankings of the eight strategies in five basic price senarios: major 
price decline, moderate price decline, no change in price, moderate 
price increase, and major price increase. For each price senario, a 
ranking is given to the eight different strategies with the first being 
the best strategy and the eighth strategy being the worst. 
An implicit assumption of the table is that there is no production 
uncertainty in the producer's production and total production in the 
industry. If prices and the production level of the producer are 
uncertain, the ranking of the marketing alternatives may be different 
from those present on Table 8. For example, if the producer's crop 
production is below what is planned and a significant number of producers 
experience this decline in production, the price of the commodity will 
rise. Such a situation makes the put option more attractive because of 
its ability to benefit from upward price movements. In the same manner, 
a production increase implies lower prices and the downward price protectipn 
of the put becomes more important (10, pp. 1821) . Keep in mind that 
Table 8 deals only with changes in the price level, not changes in both 
price and production levels. 
An important conclusion of the chart involves the competitiveness 
of puts as a strategy. In none of the price senario's would the buying 
Table 8: Ranking of Alternative Marketing Strategies Under Five Basic 
Price Change Senarios. 
Ranking CHANGE IN FUTURES PRICE 
of Major Moderate No Change Moderate Major 
Specific Price Price in the Price Price .. Strategy Decline Decline Price Increase Increase 
First Forward In-the-Money At-the-Money Out-of-the- Cash 
Contracting Call Call Money Call Marketing 
Second In-the-Money At-the-Money Out-of-the Cash Out-of-the 
Call Call Money Call Marketing Money Call 
Third In-the-Money Out-of-the In-the-Money At-the-Money Out-of-the 
Put Call Call Call Put 
Fourth At-the-Money Forward Cash In-the-Money At-the-Money 
Call Contracting Marketing Call Call 
Fifth At-the-Money Cash Forward Out-of-the At-the-Money 
Put Marketing Contracting Money Put Put 
Sixth Out-of-the In-the-Money Out-of-the At-the- Money In-the-Money 
Call Put Put Put Call 
Seventh Out-of-the At-the-Money In-the-Money Forward In-the-Money 
Put Put Put Contracting Put 
Eighth Cash Out-of-the At-the-Money In-the-Money Forward 
Marketing Money Put Put Put Contracting 
of a put be the best strategy and the highest rank achieved by any put 
strategy was third. Why? Time value is a wasting asset , i. e. as the 
option approaches expiration , its time value declines. The decline in 
time value is a cost to the buyer of a put option. If the expectation 
is for a major price decline , the best strategy is forward contracting. 
However , if time premiums are large on the options , the selling of call 
options may provide a significant source of price protection. Table 8 
clearly indicates that the task of price risk management by producers 
will require careful consideration of price outlook. But the most 
important aspect of the options is their ability to provide producers a 
middle ground in marketing. One does not have to trade away all the 
potential of improved prices to avoid some of the price risk associated 
with agricultural marketing. 
Additional Readings on Options 
In the reference section is cited a number of articles and books 
that the producer or other interested parties may consider. The literature 
on stock options and their trading can be useful to a reader. However , 
differences do exist between stock options and the commodity options. 
The underlying distributions of prices for commodity futures contracts 
are probably different from common stocks. There are certain periods of 
the year when agricultural commodity prices are more unstable and these 
periods are well known , i. e. spring planting. Also , futures contracts 
do not pay dividends like common stocks. There will be considerable 
need for research to develop models for the pricing of agricultural 
commodity options to assist decision making (4) . 
Computer Models for Options 
South Dakota State University is currently developing a computer 
program that will evaluate commodity options based on the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model (2 , 11 , 12 , 13) .  WARNING : THIS MODEL SHOULD NOT 
BE USED AS AN ESTIMATOR OF ACTUAL OPTION PREMIUM LEVELS OR USED IN 
TRADING STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE WHAT OPTION PREMIUMS WILL BE OR SHOULD 
EXIST AT A FUTURE DATE. BEFORE USING THE MODEL, THE USER SHOULD READ 
ABOUT BOTH THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF USING THE MODEL IN THE 
TRADING OF OPTIONS . The model should only be one, among many tools to 
be used to establish a trading strategy . 
Realize the validity of  the model has, as yet, to be tested on 
actual commodity option prices . Previous reseach on the stock market 
options has found the model to overestimate the option premium o f  in­
the-money options and underestimate the option premium of  out-of-the­
money options (4) . Previous research has found cash and futures prices 
to have price patterns that may not be totally consistent with the 
probability distribution assumed by this model (8, 14, 15) . A source of  
discussing the limitations of  the model in its application to stock 
options is Copeland and Weston . 
Rather than concentrating on the Black-Scholes model, the user of  
the program may want to concentrate on  gaining a perspective on  the 
price volatility of  the futures contracts . Remember that price volatility 
is an important factor in the determination of time value of an option 
premium . For example, the purchaser of  a put will want to buy puts 
during periods o f  low price volatility if the put strategy appears to be 
appropriate . 
Current plans are for the placement of the model on the AGNET 
system . Hopefully this model will have the ability to access AGNET ' s  
futures contract price files. This will enable the user to establish 
the historical price volatility of  the futures contracts during previous 
time periods . 
Some individuals may be interested in having their own microcomputer 
• 
option valuation models. A three article sequence by John Labuszewski 
in the Commodities Futures magazine can provide assistance in this 
ef fort. The program is written in Microsoft M-Basic. He did not write 
his BASIC program in double percision. The option values provided in 
the article should be viewed with some skeptism . Option values calculated 
in other papers and on our mainframe using a FORTRAN program did not 
agree with his estimates. Do not spend long hours attempting to duplicate 
his numbers if your are confident you have entered the model correctly. 
This advice is based on some very frustrating hours experienced by the 
author in attempting to accomplish that task . However, the estimates of 
the neutral hedge ratio do appear to be correct (11, 12, 13). 
• 
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